The Magazine of the Union of Concerned Scientists Vol. 17 No. 2 Summer 1995

The China Card
Will China agree to cut off fissile material production?

by Lisbeth Gronlund, Yong Liu, and David Wright

		in global security   International Cooperation

For years arms control proponents have advocated halting the production of fissile material (separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium) as a means of capping the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon states (Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States). Since the 1970s, countries that have forsworn nuclear weapons have viewed a cutoff convention as an important way for the nuclear weapon states to show good faith toward nuclear disarmament -- one of their obligations under the NPT. Now, arms control advocates see a production cutoff as an important nonproliferation measure, one that would for the first time bring the undeclared nuclear weapon states -- India, Israel, and Pakistan -- into the international nonproliferation regime. Although these states have remained unwilling to sign the NPT, they may be persuaded to sign a cutoff convention, which would ensure that their nuclear arsenals and material stocks would be frozen at relatively low levels. Since the declared nuclear states either are believed to have stopped producing fissile material for weapons -- or in the case of Russia, pledged to stop by 2000 -- and several of these states already have large stockpiles of material, this opportunity to enroll the undeclared nuclear weapon states is the most compelling reason to negotiate a production cutoff.

Although a cutoff convention would be open to signature by all countries, its primary target is the nuclear weapon states, declared and undeclared. The real key to the success of a cutoff convention, however, will be the participation of China. A major incentive for the declared nuclear weapon states to join the convention is to obtain the participation of the undeclared states. But India will not sign unless China does, and Pakistan will not sign unless India does. So without China to bring in India and Pakistan, the cutoff may not get far off the ground.

How likely is it that China will sign? Although it refused to agree to a proposed fissile material production moratorium, China has officially stated its support for a cutoff convention. But several factors will come into play in China's eventual decision, and it is a long road between beginning negotiations and final signing of a treaty. Experts believe that China is no longer producing fissile material for weapons and that it has converted its uranium-enrichment facilities from military to civilian production, both to provide fuel for its budding nuclear power industry and for export. If this is true, it indicates that China has a stockpile of fissile material on hand for weapons. China's interest in a cutoff convention will depend in part on whether it judges its stockpile to be adequate for its current weapons and for potential future needs.

China's perceived need for larger and/or more capable nuclear forces will in turn depend to some extent on the actions of the other nuclear weapon states. For example, the United States is developing missile defenses intended to intercept much longer range missiles than current systems. In response, China recently issued a strong public objection, saying that such defenses could render China's small arsenal of strategic missiles "completely ineffective" and leave China open to blackmail. If China continues to be concerned about US (and possibly Russian) plans to deploy new missile defenses, it may want to maintain the option to expand and modernize its arsenal to be able to overwhelm such defenses; a fissile material production cutoff may then not be in China's interest.

China may also be concerned that a cutoff convention would give unfair advantage to the United States and Russia. Some Chinese scientists believe that China would consider a cutoff convention to be fair and of practical significance only if the United States and Russia greatly reduced their large existing military stocks of fissile material for weapons, as well as their large numbers of deployed nuclear weapons.

On the positive site, a cutoff convention would directly address the threat posed by India's nuclear weapons program. Chinese scientists affiliated with that country's program have pointed out that India's nuclear infrastructure is large enough that it could possibly outproduce China in the future if it desired. This concern might provide an incentive for China to sign a cutoff convention that includes India, since India's signature on such an agreement would freeze that country's nuclear weapons program in an inferior position.

Another deciding factor for China will be how countries' compliance with a cutoff convention would be verified. Verification will necessarily include international monitoring measures, called safeguards, which would require each state to establish an accounting system for its fissile material and to submit to on-site inspections to determine the accuracy of this system. China has traditionally been opposed to intrusive verification measures, but its attitude appears to be evolving. Although China repeatedly expressed concerns about the challenge inspections that were included in the Chemical Weapons Convention, for example, China did sign that accord.

China's interest in signing a cutoff convention will also depend on the expectations of other countries. It has become increasingly important to China to be viewed as a responsible member of the "nuclear club." Indeed, in the last several years, China has signed on to a number of international arms control agreements that it previously avoided or even denounced, including the NPT. Although it may prefer that such agreements not require any sacrifice or impose constraints on its military programs, China does appear willing to accept such constraints when not doing so would seriously damage its international reputation. Its anticipated agreement to a comprehensive test ban is a case in point: the treaty does not serve China's narrow military interests since, of all the nuclear weapons states, it has conducted the least number of nuclear tests and is pushing its testing schedule to be able to sign by its promised date of 1996. Nevertheless, China has apparently recognized that signing a comprehensive test ban would bring important political benefits.

From a narrow security viewpoint, China may believe that the costs of signing a cutoff convention outweigh the benefits. Depending on the size of China's existing fissile material stocks and its perceived need for larger future forces, a cutoff could impose real constraints on China's nuclear forces. Moreover, the verification provisions may be unpalatable to China's military.

Nevertheless, China could well find it in its broader interests to sign a cutoff convention, especially since it may be loath to be the only holdout on a cutoff convention among the five declared nuclear weapon states. But the other declared states, particularly the United States and Russia, need to make signing the convention more attractive to China. If the United States and Russia made a commitment that significant portions of their existing stocks of fissile material would not be used for weapons, for example, this would in part address China's concerns about fairness. Other steps to reduce US and Russian nuclear superiority, such as deeper cuts in deployed weapons, would also likely make a cutoff more attractive to China. Finally, China seems genuinely concerned about possible future US and Russian missile-defense systems and their effect on China's deterrent; these countries should take this concern seriously. The cutoff convention presents an important opportunity to limit the nuclear ambitions of India, Israel, and Pakistan and to add controls on the weapons programs of the declared nuclear weapon states. UCS is working to make sure that this opportunity is not lost.

Yong Liu was a UCS arms research fellow. Lisbeth Gronlund and David Wright are UCS senior staff scientists and research fellows in MIT's Program for Defense and Arms Control Studies.

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