The Magazine of the Union of Concerned Scientists Vol. 19 No. 4 Winter 1997
A Test Ban for All Seasons
by Tom Zamora Collina, Director of UCS's Arms Control Program and Eric Sohn, a Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow at UCS
The stage is now set for the most important arms control battle of 1998. The Senate fight over ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will be a water shed event for efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and its fate will in large part determine the future of arms control for years to come.
On September 22, one year after becoming the first world leader to sign the nuclear test ban, President Clinton sent the treaty to the Senate for ratification. But ratification is far from automatic: the Republican party platform opposes the test ban, and several influential senators are outspoken skeptics.
During a speech at the United Nations, the president called the test ban "the longest-sought, hardest-fought prize in the history of arms control." The administration is calling for Senate hearings this fall, with debate and a vote on the Senate floor next spring. The biggest obstacle to this plan could be Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), who chairs the Foreign Relations Committee. Typically, this committee must approve international treaties before they can face a vote by the entire Senate. But according to Helms's spokesperson, "this treaty is not on the front burner."
Too bad, given that the United States would benefit from rapid ratification. All of the declared nuclear-weapon states (Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States) have signed the treaty, and over 140 nations altogether have signed. Since the United States has not conducted a nuclear test for five years, and will likely never test again, we need to make sure that other nations don't test either. This job will be easier with the treaty in force -- and that cannot happen without US ratification.
There are many sound reasons why the United States signed the treaty in the first place.
- It would greatly constrain the ability of the nuclear-weapon states to develop new types of nuclear weapons.
- It would weaken the ability of developing nations to produce more sophisticated bombs and missile warheads.
- It would help preserve the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the bedrock of US efforts to stop the spread of the bomb.
In short, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty reduces the nuclear danger to the American people. And we get all this at no cost to US nuclear deterrence, because the United States has no technical need for continued nuclear testing. The president and the Defense Department believe that the US arsenal is safe and reliable and should remain so for the foreseeable future.
But these arguments for a test ban treaty are not enough for treaty opponents, who will advocate delaying ratification. Opponents maintain that since the treaty cannot go into force until it is ratified by 43 other nations, including India -- which has said that it will not sign -- the United States might as well wait until India comes around before moving ahead. Opponents further claim that the treaty cannot be verified, and that the Department of Energy's program to maintain the nuclear arsenal without nuclear testing won't work.
UCS believes that these arguments are mistaken distractions from the central fact that the test ban treaty will enhance US national security. With so much to gain, the United States must lead by example and should be doing everything in its power to move this treaty into force as soon as possible. India may not ratify for years, but it certainly won't if it can hide behind the fact that the United States has not done so. And we lose nothing by taking the lead, since we will not be legally constrained by the treaty until Russia, China, and India ratify too.
As for verification and maintenance of the nuclear arsenal, UCS believes that the benefits of moving ahead with ratification outweigh any risks.
- Hostile states will have little incentive to cheat, since the likelihood of getting caught is high for tests of significant yield, and the military utility of small tests is quite limited.
- Any nuclear test that might escape detection would not pose a threat to US security, given this country's superior nuclear and conventional forces.
- The United States has been maintaining its nuclear arsenal for 50 years with proven and dependable techniques, and the Department of Energy maintains the facilities to produce replacement parts for warheads if needed.
The importance of the test ban transcends the treaty itself. As with the Chemical Weapons Convention before it, failure to ratify the test ban treaty would be a major setback for all arms control efforts. If the Senate is seen as incapable of taking positive action here, there would be little incentive to move on other arms control fronts that require Senate ratification, such as the third Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START III). The considerable momentum behind arms control in the international community would be blunted. And the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- which was extended indefinitely in 1995 largely on a promise from the nuclear-weapon states that a test ban would be achieved -- could suffer if the test ban treaty fails because of US neglect.
UCS is working to make sure that such a failure does not happen. We chair a coalition of arms control and environmental organizations that is working with the Clinton administration to win Senate ratification of the test ban treaty. We are alerting our members to important opportunities to affect congressional decisions on this issue, traveling to key states to meet with local leaders and editorial boards, and making sure this issue is covered fairly in the media.
In his recent speech at the United Nations, President Clinton said that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty "will help to prevent the nuclear powers from developing more advanced and more dangerous weapons. It will limit the possibilities for other states to acquire such devices." We believe that these are objectives worth fighting for.
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